



In the project reported here, our colleagues and we 
undertook a cross-national, cross-technology study of the 
distributional effects of emerging technologies. Our central 
research question was how policy interventions affect 
distributional outcomes for the same technology under 
different national conditions. Our goal was to identify options 
for policymakers to spread the benefits of emerging 
technologies broadly.  
Emerging technologies are a strategic research site for 
examining the interactions of inequalities between countries 
and inequalities within countries. We define emerging 
technologies as new and research-based, with potential broad 
impact. Why study emerging technologies? First, precisely 
because they are new, emerging technologies are the site of 
change and growth in both global and local economies. The 
techno-economic networks that support them are still young 
and malleable, but are projected to be more significant as time 
goes on. They therefore represent a good place for public 
interventions towards equality. Second, because emerging 
technologies are research-based, they are more likely to be 
sold at high prices (as firms try to recoup research and 
development costs) and to demand high levels of skills in the 
production process. Both these characteristics give emerging 
technologies a higher potential than older technologies for 
increasing inequalities in access and employment. 
Third, emerging technologies stand at the intersection of 
global and national distributive processes. The dominant 
pattern in emerging technologies has been that new 
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technologies have been developed in North America, Europe, 
or North Asia (the “Triad” regions), then diffused to other 
parts of the world, either when a multi-national firm decides to 
place a production facility there or when the technology 
becomes available for purchase. The benefits and costs that 
people experience in creating, producing, and using countries 
as a result of this process vary greatly among countries and 
technologies, but a global pattern of inequality nonetheless 
emerges. When we consider only this pattern, technology-
creating countries always appear to be starting the revolutions, 
and technology-using countries always appear to be trying to 
catch up.  
To create a different pattern, however, many non-Triad 
countries invest in their local capabilities in emerging 
technologies, not only to provide better absorptive capacity for 
using the technologies to meet local needs, but also as the 
basis for using the emerging technology to create local 
business opportunities. Indeed, the Millennium Project task 
force on innovation [1] recommended that every developing 
country invest in “platform technology” areas, such as 
biotechnology, ICTs, and nanotechnology. These investments 
might create a re-distributional pattern with significant 
implications for the relationships between technologies and 
inequalities.  
Work Package Four studied five technologies that emerged 
in the past, in order to inform thinking about technologies that 
are emerging now or will do so in the future. This summary 
describes our approach and reports the main results and 
conclusions of the study. Each technology’s history is 
different, making the findings complex. They illustrate both 
the best and the worst of distributional outcomes. They all 
show, however, that public interventions do make a difference, 
from commercialization environments to competition policies. 
Options are available to public decision makers for spreading 
the opportunities and benefits of emerging technologies more 
broadly.  
II.  METHODS 
WP4 used case study methodology, which starts with a 
qualitative model of the phenomenon of interest and uses that 
model to try to understand the dynamics of each case. This 
method depends on replication logic rather than statistical 
generalization to a population. If the model predicts what 
happens in the cases, it is confirmed. If reality does not quite 
match the model, as happens quite often, then the analyst has a 




basis for modifying the model, which is then ready to be tested 
against another case.  
The model WP4 was testing, although largely implicitly, 
was the classic model of technology diffusion. It posits that 
after a new science-based technology is developed in the 
research and development department of a firm, it is typically 
introduced in a sophisticated, high-priced version that is 
marketed to a limited number of high-end users. As the market 
expands, the price of production falls and the firms producing 
the technology market simpler versions in order to reach 
broader markets. Eventually, the price drops far enough that 
the product reaches a mass market.  
We chose a diverse set of technologies to compare with this 
model as well as a diverse set of national contexts. This 
diversity gave the model a series of tough tests and created 
many opportunities to modify and improve it. The information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) we included are 
mobile phones and open source software. They represent both 
the proprietary and non-proprietary ends of the ownership 
spectrum. Mobile phones are widely hailed as a modern 
technology that has helped the poor a great deal, and open 
source is thought to create better, less expensive software 
options as well as new business opportunities. Among 
biotechnologies, we chose one health product, recombinant 
insulin, the first biotechnology health product to be approved 
and one with wide applicability. In agriculture, we chose both 
a sophisticated product, genetically-modified maize, which is 
produced through genetic engineering, and at the other 
extreme, plant tissue culture, an older and relatively simple 
technique that was nonetheless just reaching one of our chosen 
country contexts at the beginning of the study.  
We gathered data on these five technologies using a 
common data collection protocol in eight different national 
contexts, including four developed and four developing 
countries. The ResIST team studied their own countries in 
Europe and Africa (Germany, Malta, and Mozambique), and a 
companion grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation 
allowed the U.S. colleagues to study countries in the 
Americas: Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and the 
United States. The fact that these countries ranged widely in 
size, national wealth, and science and technology capability is 
a strong point under the case study approach, since the 
operation of the classic model were examined under a wide 
range of conditions.  
The basic logic of the data gathering and analysis was that 
technological projects affect inequalities in valued items 
through pathways that are technology-specific, mediated by 
national conditions, and shaped by public interventions.2 We 
looked for distributional consequences of the technologies in 
four valued items: business opportunities, employment, 
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benefits, and costs. Not every technology was relevant in 
every country, but in the end we gathered data for 34 country-
technology pairs. We then synthesized the results for each 
technology across the country examples and synthesized 
results for each country across the technologies covered there. 
We used the country synthesis as an opportunity to develop 
policy options that were tailored to each of the eight quite 
different country contexts. 
III. PATTERNS ACROSS TECHNOLOGIES 
One of the main lessons learned from the cases concerns 
diversity. On the one hand, the specific distributional 
consequences of the technologies are quite different and are 
clearly strongly influenced by all the factors we included in 
our analysis: how the technological project was shaped by its 
champions; national conditions, in particular skills and 
poverty; and public interventions. On the other hand, the 
public interventions in each technology were relatively 
standard. And the overall distributional patterns followed 
some general patterns that we were able to see much more 
clearly from the comparison than we could have from 
individual cases.  
Technological Projects. Although we had a focus for each 
technology in the study, we still needed to search in each case 
for the technological project itself – something that some actor 
or set of actors (the “champion”) was trying to make happen. 
Among our five targets, it is clear that the technique or 
capability is not the only influence shaping the project. 
Instead, the way the technique is packaged – with what 
services, priced, in what way, with what accessories – is of the 
essence. Mobile phones are a product-service combination, 
and in this case, it turned out that the pricing for the service 
itself was a crucial factor in extending the market: pre-paid 
plans are widely seen as the way low income consumers have 
been to afford cellular access. Open source software is the 
technological project of an evangelical movement of 
programmers, along with some corporate giants who are 
interested in a way to compete with the proprietary software 
manufacturers. The business model is new: the product is free, 
but in its business forms, the service that adapts it and keeps it 
running are not. BT maize is one product designed to be used 
with another, a pesticide, and recombinant insulin is also 
marketed along with, although not designed for, a set of 
supplies for testing blood sugar and administering the drug 
itself.  
But each technology is not completely malleable; each 
carries certain requirements of technical skills and 
infrastructural conditions that limit the creativity of 
technological champions. Micro propagation, for example, has 
to be done in a clean facility. This creates a floor on the level 
of investment that must be made for the technology to be 
available and thus limits the possibility for the industry to 
lower the cost of the product far enough for small farmers to 
afford it in some of the countries we studied.  
 
Distributional consequences: business opportunities.  The 
science base of the emerging technologies we have studied 
leads, in three out of five technologies, to a strong role for 
intellectual property in creating a business opportunity. In the 
mobile case, a welter of IP holdings tend to be cross-licensed 
within the industry and the advantage of being a country that 
is home to a technology creator is seen in the role the 
Blackberry patents are playing in Canada in keeping some 
manufacturing there. The original patent on recombinant 
insulin was licensed to firms that are still the main competitors 
in the field, and Monsanto protects its intellectual property in 
GM maize with an aggressive legal campaign. In all these 
cases, IP protection has the tendency of concentrating assets 
and business opportunities. In contrast, in two of the studies IP 
is either not important (tissue culture) or used to disperse the 
business opportunities (open source, which enforces open IP).  
In these two cases, however, there were other barriers to 
entry for new businesses. In the open source example, an 
individual or company must have a high level of technical 
skills to get into the business. Skills are also quite important in 
plant tissue culture, plus the significant capital investment 
already mentioned for a clean facility. IP is therefore not the 
only aspect of emerging technologies that tends to concentrate 
business activity rather than spreading it.  Likewise, the cases 
reveal a number of other strategies that large firms are using to 
hold onto monopoly rents that have their IP at the core, such 
as Monsanto’s acquisition of local seed companies and related 
services.  
The science base of the emerging technologies also implies 
that micro-enterprise is an unlikely beneficiary of the new 
development, and in three out of five stories, this hypothesis is 
confirmed. Bu software piracy is small business, and like open 
source undermines the concentrating effects of the proprietary 
software business. And in the mobile phone story, micro-
enterprise is a prominent feature, from local businesses that 
sell minutes on cell phones to those who do not own them to 
the ubiquitous pre-paid card venders in Mozambique. Both 
these examples involve micro-enterprises based on re-selling 
small quantities of something that another company has 
manufactured.  
Distributional consequences: employment. We were a bit 
surprised to find some manufacturing jobs associated with our 
five technologies located in the affluent countries in the study. 
These were high-skill jobs in the pharmaceutical industry, 
which are not numerous but pay quite well. At the other end of 
the spectrum are the sales jobs associated with emerging 
technologies that are shaped to reach a mass or even bottom of 
the pyramid market. Sometimes the new product does not 
produce new jobs, but is rather absorbed into an existing 
production process. New jobs in the new industries thus do not 
always displace older jobs, but may in fact retain them. The 
most obvious loss of jobs associated with the technological 
changes we studied were the losses in landline telephones. In 
the farm sector, although micro propagation as an expensive 
input tended to help small farms fold and larger farms grow, 
the larger farms were employing people in different kinds of 
jobs, so no clear downward trend in employment was visible. 
The employment issue associated with ownership was the 
unhappy circumstance that multi-national enterprises were 
able to move jobs into and also out of a national economy. 
This was obviously disruptive nationally and can contribute to 
unemployment and poverty. But from a global viewpoint, the 
practice probably has a dispersing rather than concentrating 
effect. And Malta has used attracting foreign direct investment 
as an employment-generating opportunity.  
Distributional consequences: benefits and costs. All the 
technological projects we studied provided benefits, so the 
diffusion of the technology itself is one important indicator of 
the distribution of those benefits. As expected, price is an 
important determinant of diffusion or penetration rate, but we 
were interested to find that it was definitely not the only one. 
The most dramatic illustration of another factor determining 
patterns of use is in the open source example. By definition, 
the product itself is free; but this simply means that other 
factors shape the distributional patterns. For the business 
applications, large firms were more likely than small ones to 
use open source software, primarily because a firm needs in-
house expertise to absorb and maintain the product when it 
does not come bundled with support from a proprietary 
software company. On the consumer side, open source 
software provides no benefit if you do not have a computer, so 
having enough money to acquire the computer itself becomes 
the limiting factor.  
Likewise, the traditional diffusion model’s prediction that 
products will initially be expensive but that prices will drop as 
a mass market emerges does not characterize all the cases. 
Tissue cultured banana plantings were free for a while in 
Jamaica, in a program subsidized by the European Union. 
When the subsidy stopped, large farmers were able to import 
material but the small farmers simply went back to using 
previous methods. The high capital and labor costs of micro 
propagation put a minimum price on the planting material that 
did not allow it to reach the market at the bottom of this 
agricultural pyramid.  
The complementary assets of skill and infrastructure then 
serve as important secondary factors shaping distribution. 
Complementary assets can even turn benefits into risks and 
costs for emerging technologies. Our example is recombinant 
insulin. Doctors in Mozambique do not always prescribe 
insulin in medical situations where doctors in Europe or the 
U.S. would, because their patients are so poor that their lives 
cannot sustain the regimen of the treatment. Under the 
circumstances of these patients, insulin can actually be a life-
threatening drug; the risks of taking it would be greater than 
the benefits.  
Public interventions, a somewhat broader concept than 
pubic policies and programs but closely related, are key 
variables in our analysis. Public interventions affect emerging 
technologies in the contexts of both discovery and 
commercialization.  
 
In terms of the context of discovery, our five technologies 
had diverse histories. The institutional environments that gave 
rise to the principles involved in the technologies included 
international public laboratories (plant tissue culture), 
publicly-funded university research (recombinant insulin, GM 
maize), and private laboratories (mobile phones and open 
source software). All were conceived in pursuit of some 
general public benefit. One could not predict which of the five 
would produce the broadest benefits by knowing where their 
underlying principles were discovered.  
A sharp bifurcation begins to emerge, however, as the 
principles are turned into practices. At this stage, intellectual 
property rules, a traditional instrument of STI policy, make a 
significant difference, as we described earlier. In addition, five 
main categories of interventions that fall outside traditional 
STI policy appear in the cases: public procurement; public 
utility oversight; anti-trust actions; health and safety 
regulations; and environmental protection. The first three are 
mildly to strongly re-distributive, while the latter two affect 
access negatively because while reducing overall risk they 
also raise costs, often unevenly across producers. Let us say a 
few words about each. 
Clearly, if an emerging technology represents an 
irreplaceable capacity to solve a basic problem, governments 
are likely to intervene to make sure that capability is available 
to everyone in some form. Among our cases, recombinant 
insulin exemplifies this phenomenon (with some exceptions, 
as noted below). Insurance schemes or health services provide 
access to basic medicines for most people in most places, and 
when they cannot afford to do so, NGO coalitions are likely to 
intervene to ameliorate the situation, as they did with AIDS 
medication. Interestingly, public provision also plays a role in 
tissue culture and micro propagation, where making quality 
planting material available to farmers is seen in some contexts 
as a public responsibility. Most consumer goods fall outside 
this “essential” category, so we would not expect governments 
to subsidize or purchase mobile phones for poor individuals; 
but interestingly, governments have started to acquire for their 
populations the new inexpensive laptop computers, some of 
which are equipped with open source software.  
Public utilities are also closely regulated because of the 
perception that they provide basic services that should be 
accessible to all citizens. Public utility oversight therefore 
plays a re-distributive role in some countries in the mobile 
phone example. Telecommunications regulators are concerned 
with keeping services “affordable” and encouraging tariff 
structures that extend service broadly rather than concentrating 
it only among the affluent or in urban areas that are easier to 
serve. These principles are historically rooted in oversight of 
land line telephones. They are clearly de-concentrating or re-
distributive.  
Telecommunications regulators have sometimes allowed 
“natural monopolies” in land line service, but are more 
concerned with creating or maintaining competition in the 
mobile phone sector. The higher level of competition in the 
sector appears to contribute to the push to provide service in 
smaller increments to lower-income consumers. The 
characteristics of the technology also contribute: the ease of 
installing capacity and the negligible incremental costs of 
serving additional consumers within a geographic area. 
Anti-trust regulation also plays a role in the distributive 
effects of open source software. Open source software breaks 
one source of monopoly created by proprietary software 
companies, namely, ownership of and secrecy around source 
code. Opening up source code creates small and medium-scale 
business opportunities for support firms and others that want 
to develop applications, and thus distributes business 
opportunity more broadly than the five software giants (four 
American and one German) would do on their own. At the 
same time, however, the requirement for a high level of 
complementary programming skills to be able to absorb and 
maintain open source software has led to the irony that large 
firms are more likely than small firms actually to use it – a 
negative distributional effect.  
The other sets of public interventions that we have 
encountered in the cases are health, safety, and environmental 
regulations. Recombinant insulin needed to be approved by 
the U.S. FDA, then re-approved in other countries, in order to 
be available for use. GM maize likewise needed to be cleared 
for planting, under regulations that vary from full approval in 
the U.S. and Canada to limited approval in Europe to outright 
prohibition in Costa Rica and Mozambique. The 
environmental regulations in Europe are an interesting 
example of how these kinds of regulations raise costs and 
therefore have a concentrating rather than dispersing effect. 
Farmers in the Czech Republic, our example country for GM 
maize in Europe, only find GM maize useful if they are in an 
area that where their crops are susceptible to European Corn 
Borer. If they need to use the GM variety, they not only face 
the higher costs of the seed, but also the higher costs of 
meeting European regulations for planting, such as leaving 
open zones around their field to prevent cross-fertilization. 
Small farms on the edge financially are not as likely to be able 
to absorb these costs as larger operations. Similarly, the 
regulatory approval process raises production costs for drug 
manufacturers – costs that they pass on to consumers in the 
form of higher prices. Those prices in turn make it harder for 
poor people and poor countries to get access to the benefits of 
the drug.  
 
IV. PATTERNS WITHING AND ACROSS COUNTRIES 
National conditions, one of the key variables in our 
analysis, played a different role than we pictured when we 
started the project. Distributional consequences for the 
individual technologies are not mediated by averages, like 
those given in the introduction for the case study countries, but 
rather by specific conditions for particular individuals, firms, 
or companies. For example, for a firm to be able to use open 
source software, it is not the average level of programming 
 
skills for the country that is important but rather the firm’s 
own in-house expertise. Likewise, while the low average 
income per capita in Mozambique indicates that it is a country 
where many, many people are very poor, individuals with 
good incomes in the capital city can afford to buy a mobile 
phone or drive to South Africa to buy insulin.  
This finding points to the fact that pockets of concentrated 
expertise can make a difference in whether a technology’s 
benefits are accessible in a particular country. However, some 
of the national contexts in our study were better able than 
others o provide multiple opportunities for the absorption of 
new technologies into economy and society. The two major 
non-price constraints that we described above -- skill and 
infrastructure -- are not often constraints at all in the affluent 
countries in our study, Canada, Germany, Malta, and the U.S. 
In those countries, there the distributional issues have to do 
with spreading the business opportunities around 
geographically, creating equal opportunity for traditionally 
marginalized groups, and subsidizing access in some cases. 
Without special policy efforts to distribute the benefits 
broadly, emerging technologies are absorbed through the 
existing relations of power and production and tend to increase 
the wealth and influence of those already at the top in those 
contexts.  
The picture is much different for the low and middle 
income countries in our study, Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Jamaica, and Mozambique. There emerging technologies 
comes appear most often in the hands of multi-national firms. 
(Plant tissue culture is an exception to which we will return in 
a moment.) The multinationals not only own the new 
technology, but can also buy up any local firms that might 
compete with them – as Eli Lilly Company bought out the 
Argentine interest in synthesized porcine insulin in the 1920s. 
Ownership gives control and is clearly accompanied by 
relations of unequal power.  
Across the four low and middle income countries of the 
study, there is significant variation in the extent to which local 
businesses grow up around the technologies. Argentina 
supports a lot, and Costa Rica supports local as well as 
multinational banana farms through its research facility. 
Micro-businesses may thrive in the shadow of the large firms, 
like the street vendors who sell recharge cards for mobile 
phones on the street in Mozambique. But a number of 
businesses we would have expected did not appear in the data: 
no open source firms in Costa Rica, despite a significant 
software sector; no plant tissue culture business in Jamaica.  
As noted earlier, no major shifts in employment were 
visible in any of our case studies. The shift that seemed most 
likely was the substitution of recombinant for porcine-based 
insulin that affected the production facility in Argentina; but 
local action prevented the plant from closing and a local 
market maintains it. The contrast with well-known cases like 
Korea and Thailand in which production of high-technology 
products has moved to developing countries is striking, and 
illustrates how limited those other experiences are, and how 
hard it is to generalize from them to other developing 
countries. 
All the technologies we studied were widely accessible in 
Argentina, Costa Rica, and Jamaica, with some rather specific 
holes in coverage. The wide availability of recombinant 
insulin, for example, was largely as a result of health 
insurance and public health services, so where someone did 
not have access, it was because they were not covered – a 
situation that characterized a surprising 25% of Argentines 
and probably the full 40% of Jamaicans who work in the 
informal economy.  
The situation was different in Mozambique. Since there are 
only 20,000 computers in this country of 20 million, not many 
would have been able to benefit from open source software. 
Mobile phones are heavily concentrated among male users in 
Maputo, according to a telephone survey done by our 
Mozambican team. And for the estimated 80,000 diabetics in 
the country, only enough insulin for perhaps 50-100 is 
imported. Doctors in Mozambique are reluctant to prescribe 
insulin to people in poor households who will not be able to 
maintain the necessary regimen. So ironically, while insulin is 
free through the public health service there, rich people are 
much more likely to benefit from that policy than poor ones. 
Likewise, ironically, pre-paid phone plans make mobiles 
accessible to poor consumers, but they pay more per minute 
used.  
None of these limitations is inevitable, as the story of the 
tissue-cultured orange flesh sweet potato plantings in 
Mozambique illustrates. In that case, a government laboratory 
has been working with several NGOs to provide the higher 
quality plantings to small farmers, mostly women. They are 
successful in part because the technique is publicly available 
and free, as well as because of their community-based multi-
pronged approach involving education and subsidies.  
V. THE TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSITION 
We are beginning to tie these various observations together 
with a new concept, a structural feature of the global economy 
that we will call the technological transition.3 One set of 
diffusion and adoption dynamics is characteristic above the 
transition point and another set below. Predictable shifts in 
dynamics therefore occur for any given technology at the point 
of transition, an inflection point in the global income 
distribution, placed such that below the transition point will be 
a disproportionate number of women and members of 
disadvantaged religious and ethnic groups.  
Above the transition point, champions can choose among 
luxury or mass markets for the products they create from the 
technological opportunity. Basic infrastructure can be taken 
 
3 This is an analogy to a concept in public health of the epidemiological 
transition: that one set of diseases characterizes countries with incomes up to a 
certain level, after which certain infrastructural conditions have been met and 
a different set of diseases emerges against the background of generally good 
public health. The first set is the “diseases of poverty” and the second set “the 
diseases of affluence.” 
 
for granted and champions must compete for the portion of a 
market created by the variety they offer. Technological 
choices involve relatively small costs in relation to income, 
and consumers have the resources and leisure to shop around. 
Below the technological transition point, the product may 
be irrelevant (open source software for people without 
electricity let alone computers) or downright dangerous 
(insulin in an urban slum). If the product reaches poor 
consumers at all, it is likely to be either in second-hand form 
(like the hand-me-down mobile phones common in Maputo) 
or broken down into small lots that cost more per unit (again, 
the higher rates per minute for pre-paid versus contract mobile 
phone access illustrate). They thus pay a larger share of their 
income to have access to the benefit, and the whole issue of 
benefits becomes more acute because the opportunity costs are 
relatively higher. The important questions then do not have to 
do with access per se, but rather with whether access might 
actually be counter-productive.  
VI. POLICY OPTIONS 
Clearly, there is no one-size-fits-all set of recommendations 
that can be made based on our findings. Even among the 
developed and among the developing countries, national 
circumstances and political traditions differ and call for 
different approaches to spreading the benefits of emerging 
technologies broadly. We can, however, make a few 
generalizations based on the findings of the study.  
The analysis has assumed that opening up new business 
opportunities with new actors in new places is one way to 
reduce economic inequalities. Intellectual property protection 
is a key policy for shaping those opportunities for emerging 
technologies, both within countries and in global economic 
relationships. Our results suggest that a broader range of 
economic actors will be able to develop the technology if 
patent and copyright protection are limited to their original 
purpose, providing a temporary monopoly, rather than a 
strategic resource for large corporations to extend the 
monopoly. The more licensing is required for publicly-
discovered techniques, and the more techniques that can be 
put in the public domain, the more organizations will develop 
them and the more uses will be invented. This diversity is the 
most powerful tool for spreading the benefits of emerging 
technologies broadly.  
On employment, the results suggest national vigilance, but 
not panic. Based on our cases, the new technologies are most 
likely to shift jobs from one category to another, demanding 
somewhat higher skills, rather than to cause wholesale 
unemployment. These results provide a cautionary note to 
counter the claims in developed countries that new 
technologies will generate enormous numbers of new jobs.  
The uneven distribution of the costs of new technologies 
certainly features in our results. The costs in these cases were 
primarily financial, not the health and safety risks that often 
feature in accounts of emerging technologies. Our results 
suggest that policymakers want to be vigilant about uneven 
distributions of costs, for example, the additional cost of 
regulation that some Czech corn farmers face if their 
ecological position makes GM maize their best technological 
option; or the higher unit costs paid by pre-paid mobile 
subscribers. Regulators have a responsibility to spread costs 
and prices fairly.  
This brings us to the center of our analysis, the distribution 
of benefits of the emerging technologies. The cases suggest 
that this is not an issue for every new technology. High-end 
consumer goods, like fancy mobile phones and the newest 
generation insulin, are luxuries that do not warrant the 
attention of public policymakers. When emerging technologies 
produce major improvements, however, that can be provided 
at low cost to large numbers of people, it is important for 
public policy to seek to create the conditions to let that 
happen. Sometimes that may be public procurement, as in 
health service provision of recombinant insulin. But the issue 
may also loop back to the discussion of business opportunities. 
Government can use competition to bring down prices and 
extend markets. Keeping IP protection to a limited term also 
helps.  
Public interventions on emerging technologies can usefully 
incorporate two concepts that have been used across the 
ResIST project. On the one hand, ET policies should try to 
reduce the representational inequalities that now characterize 
high-technology decision processes. Different groups within 
society experience the same new technology differently. To 
maximize benefits, a variety of groups should have a chance to 
shape technology itself and advise on the way it is 
incorporated into society.  
On the other hand, structural inequalities underlie all of our 
cases – gaps in capabilities that affect the absorptive capacity 
of various countries, that is, their ability to use the technology 
effectively, broadly, and on their own terms. Our cases reflect 
structural inequalities not only the lack of relevant scientists 
and engineers, but also differences in basic education and 
living conditions. Interesting, by looking one technology at a 
time, we have shown that countries do have the option develop 
pockets of expertise to increase absorptive capacity in relation 
to a particular, important technology. The work our colleagues 
have done on alternative STI strategies4 also suggests that 
reducing inequalities can start in the conception of 
technological projects themselves. Countries that find the 
technical characteristics and economic relationships of current 
technologies difficult or unworkable can apply their inventive 
capabilities to discovering versions that work in a broader 
range of circumstances, including theirs.  
In summary, the study moves the discussion of emerging 
technologies well beyond anti-corporate blame, North-South 
recriminations, and simplistic calls for liberating technological 
movements. The real worlds of emerging technologies are 
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diverse, but all carry within them the possibility of more equal 
outcomes for the world’s households.  
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CASE STUDY COUNTRIES 
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